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INTRODUCTION
In "The Origin of Geometry" Edmund Husserl mal,es a significant
claim, whose implications, especially-but not exclusi\'ely-for migra-
tory and exilic identities have not been fully conceptualised. Husser!
writes that: "the active recollection of what is past Cinvolves~ an
activity of concurrent actllal production."1 Following Husserl's lead, in
this article I aq~ue that memory is an act and a result of a comparison
between the constructed narrative of the past ;md the relation that this
narrative comes to have with the "here" and "now".~ \Ve remember,
and as we remember we look ahead to check if this memory can be
recognised, seen, captured in the present. There \vould be no memory,
and there would be no remembering, without this relation, this "active
recollection". But in order to remember-and in order to memorise,
to produce memories-the vision constituted in our mind finds little
of itself in the present. In other words, it produces, and fInds, "bad
translations". It is precisely because of tIlt' great creative "failure" of
translation that memorising can continue to take place, and that identi-
ties-lilie memories-can aUTue new f\)rms, ne\\' meanings and, in the
words of Paul Carter, "new flltures".:l It is in this sense that the appel-
lation of the "I talian Forum" in Sydney (a recent development in the
heart of Sydney's "Little Italy") as a "bad" translation of an authentic
Italian square actually, although inadYertently, catches the essential
meaning of this urban space. The Italian Forum in Sydney-like many
other migratory sites-is evidence that memory rejects "good" transla-
tions in order to remember f\)rward.
I.
"The active recollection of what is past [involves] an activity of con-
current actual production." The emphasis of Husserl's statement on
recollection is, without doubt, on the idea of production. Not only that,
but more importantly on the production that talies place in the present,
in the "now" of life. Only this mal;ing of memory in the pl'esent can
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be called, according to Husserl, "active recollection". Husser]'s notion
of "active recollection" is positive in that it entails the actual interven-
tion of the present that, as a mediator, comes to influence and perhaps
manipulate the past in this making that acquires the semblance of an
ongoing, dynamic aml ever transl()rming production. \Vas IhIsser!
implying that nlemory is ne\'er tixed, never static but always moving in
time as well as in space? If that were the case memory would not be a
crystallised image that stares immobile li'om the depth of time to catch
us as we grope around in the present; to tix us in the eye as a monitor,
as a "memory" and remembrance of what we used to be. Rather, it
would be something like an event in which we are only a singularity,
albeit a conspicuous singularity, within a crowd of other singulari-
ties. It is in this sense that Husserl's statement on "active recollection"
dramatically shifts the perspective on the traditional and conventional
understanding of men lOry, and provides a new plane through which
memory is remodelled as lite, instead of lite's death mask.
2.
The postulation of an "active recollection" invites the conceptualisation
of its opposite, a "passive recollection". \Vhat exactly does it mean to
recollect actively as opposed to recollect passively? The tirst answer
is provided by Husser! himself \\"hen, as we have seen, he pairs the
adjective "active" with the adjective "actual". The distinction is, it
seems, tirstly temporal: a men lory that resides exclusively in the past
is passive, while a nlCmory that resides in the present is active. Hut
the temporal distinction introduces by necessity a Iilrther one, this
time of definition. \Vhat do we mean by past and present respectively?
An agreement arrived at by simply accepting ordinary and conven-
tional interpr'etation of "past" and "present" would probably tilil to see
through the complexity of the issue and their implications tor a deeper
conceptualisation of nlClnory and its impact on lite.
s.
As an opening to the question of definition I could point to some of
the previous remarks, and say that while a "passive recollection" could
be detined as "memory", an "active recollection" could be defined as the
"making of 1I1emory". As it tUI'llS out, thc ditlerence is not so much tem-
pond per Sf? as cthically temporal, or, as I would preter, one of labour.
By labour I mean here the actual production of all evcnt, be it writtcn,
visual, concrete or imaginative. As a consequcnce, the ditlerence is not
between an absolute past-dead, crystallised, gone-and an absolute
past in the present-the Ilegelian temporality-hut between the telll-
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poral relation and production of the past in the present as well as the
present in the past. The dillerence is also between a memorisation that
entails the interpretation of an ol~ject-a memory-by a su~iect-the
present subject-and a memorisation in which subject and object are
synthetically interconnected.
4.
I-Ieidegger \Vas one of the first thinl,ers to warn us about making sim-
plifYing distinction bet,n~en past and present from a chronological per-
spective. lIis reflection on origin and beginning are, to Illy mind, still
essential to think fruitfully about memory+ lleidegger is best known
as the philosopher of existentialism. There is no doubt that his work
is characterised by an indebtigable and uninterrupted quest to capture
the event of the origin and essence, their meanings and philosophical
implications. \Vhat is perhaps less known and articulated is the extent
of lleidq~ger's prohlematisation of origin (UI'Sprllllg), which in the
Germiln philosopher is never a static, temporally encrusted event. In
filet, the opposite is doser to the truth. For Heidegger the origin, which
is ofi:en looked f()r among the fragments of pre-Socratic thinking, espe-
cially in the thinl,ing of Anaximander and Heraclitus, is never located
behind. It is instead always f()rward, invariably preceding and informing
the present, here and yet already ahead. The origin is. according to Hei-
degger, the very essence of becoming and the very thing of philosophy.
The origin, paraphrasing his mentor lIussert, provides the actualisa-
tion of productive thinking. It is in this sense that lIeidegger seeks
the origin through placing the pn'sellt-the present thought (his phi-
losophy)-in the sen'ice of tradition. But in doing so tradition jumps
(sprung) ahead, turning from past to future.
5.
If it is true that felr lIeidegger the event of the origin (a/etlzda) remains
the ultimate goal of philosophy, for \Valter Benjamin the origin turns
into a philosophical mediator, whose presence is indispensable not as
such, as an absolute value, but in relation to the beginning of its own
disappearance.!" The slight and yet significant difference between Ben-
jamin and Heidegger is fi)und in their distinct treatment and concep-
tualisation of production. \Vhereas for Ileidegger, production is insti-
gated by the origin in order to rejoin the origin in a movement forward,
lor Benjamin production, although still driven by the origin, becomes
the thing of philosophy and the house of thinking.
\Vhat assimilates these two "ery difl(,rent, and yet in certain aspects
similar thinl\ers, is the firm belief in the impossibility of returning.
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"Returning-" must be understood here as the g-oing- bad, to the original
home. In Benjamin and Heide~gcr there cannot be any return simply
because the hOllle that one looks fIJI" is either ahead (Heideg-g-er) or
firmly embedded in the Ilow-time (.letzt-Zeit, Benjamin) of the present
cvent. There is no home to be flllnlli if one looks fIJI' it through
memory-through passive recollection in I1usserl's terminology. A
slightly better chance is to 1001, fl)r home throug-h the making of
memory-through active recollection.
6.
As one leaves, as onc begins to be, the origin disappears into the begin-
ning or jumps ahead. Going back has no meaning-s in that nothing is
left behind. The notion of returning is one of the great misnomers
of language and thought, unless one understands returning not as
a movement badnvard but a movement forward or on the spot. And
if it is true that departing implies a return, this return can never be
a simple reversal. It is rather a process that takcs the tra\'eller even
further ahead, away f.'om itself in order to catch itself or, in the sccond
hypothesis, to catch the production that encapsulates the singularity of
til(' self
7.
In Calliers /8,'J4-/,9/4, Paul Vall;r)' wrote that "L'ctrangete cst Ie vrai
commencemcnt. Au COllllnenCemellt ctait I'ctrange."G Valery points to
the beginning- as the locus of an irredeemable f.·acture which bring-s
about not so nllich a loss as a sense of estrangement, inauthenticity.
In other wonls, the beg-inning-which must not be confused with the
origin-is not the authentic place, is not home. Turning back to it as
if it were "true home", the authentic space of the subject quidditas, can
only provoke nostalgia and melancholia, Should the beginning be con-
fused with the origin, with singularity as such, it would, then, present
the absence of the origin-its fiJreignness-plunging the observer into
passive nostalgia and a sense of impotence as the observer confronts
the impossibility of returning. This impossibility is determined by not
finding the desired object where it was thought to reside. In its place
there is only disposscssion, the feeling of "not-feeling-at-home," ;\'os-
talgia ("passive recollection") is memory that turns back, believing that
what is missing has been left behind.
8.
The Italian philosopher Aldo Giorgio Gargani, one of the most careful
readers of I1eidegger's philosophy, once wrote that: "the original can
be thought only through the relation with the copies that preceded it,"7
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I-Ieidegger's inlJuence is obvious; obvious too is the influence that Ben-
.i<lmin's relJection on translation might have had on Gargani's thought.
As in Heidegger, the original is located fi)rward, it has jumped ahead
of its copies. But most importantly the original is thought through the
copies that inform it, as in Benjamin's understanding of translation as
that which catches the originality of language--pure language (die reine
Spradle)-through the synthesis of unsupplemented languages. Trans-
lation comes after the beginning of the original and yet it precedes the
origin as the origin jumps ahead of the beginning and, consequently, of
trimslation. If this is true the entire theoretical tradition on translation
must be revised. Should translation turn back to look for the origin
in order to compare its validity, its "truthfulness", it would only lind
nostalgia, dispossession and f~lilure. Conversely, should it look forward
to see the origin, it would catch its event as becoming and potentiality.
And it is within its very nature as the "Ianguage-that-comes", that
translation can glimpse the origin. II' "passive recollection" is memory,
"passive translation" is the copy; if "active recollection" is the "making
of memory", "active translation" is the "Ianguage-that-comes".
9.
Tl'illlslating and the making of memory, as well as translation and
memory, share many things in common. Most importantly they arc
significant ciphers of the relation hetween the origin and the begin-
ning, presence and absence, past and present, visibility and invisibility,
authenticity and inauthenticity. As such they might very well say some-
thing useliil about identity.
10.
The notion of identity can be <lpproached fi'olll ditlerent angles-lin-
guistic, sociological, anthropological, literary, philosophical and so
on-and its definitions are Illultifilrious; does it relate, for instance, to
the "what" of sul~iel'tivity (the idem) or to the "who" of su~iel'tivity
(the ipse), or to both of them simultaneously and/or alternatively?
Further, identity is usually connected with a larger entity (the nation
for instance) than the subject and yet it informs the subject in ways
and to degrees that exceed other individual qualifications. Identity is
in tllrn inside and outside the subject, and it simultaneollsly includes
and excludes it, determining, as a result, notions of normality and
abnormality, inclusion and exclusion. It is inevitable that "identity"
plays an enormous and significant psychological as well as social and
political role in the life of the individual and the conmlunity. Through
the sharing of the same identity an individual belongs to a particular
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group; but it is precisely because of this simple principle that ,lI1
individual's exclusion from a group is measured on its alleged and
perceived dillerences. \\'hat is rarely grasped, as groups draw lines
to include, and by association exclude, is that identity is a dynamic
concept, forever changing and adapting, always jumping ahead of its
presumedly static inception. And yet, and notwithstanding identity's
inherent forwardness, identity is often sought out by turning backward.
[t is interesting to note that when an individual looks for a definition
of his/her identity, the locus of this definition is the past and seldom
the present or the finure. Identity, in the ordinary understanding of
the word, lives in the past and it is measured by comparing our being
in the present with our being in the past, the latter being the essential
yardstick through which one comes to recognise or fail to recognise
himself/herself There are two things to retlect on at this stage: a) in
order to read and interpret identity the individual turns back and stares
at an image which surreptitiously implies that the onlooker is poten-
tially inauthentic and therefore less original than the image observed;
the onlooker is "guilty" unless proven otherwise. It is in this sense that
dealings with identity are usually marked by a feeling of guilt and loss;
h) the face staring at us form the past is our face and yet it looks like
that of a stranger. 'The foreign is the true beginning. At the beginning
there was the fc)reign", said Valery.
11.
Could we talk, borrowing the concept from Husser!, of "active identity"
and "passive identity";> [n other words, could we speak of an identity
in the mal,ing that produces itself actively, and, on the other hand, of
a passive identity that keeps on memorising insistently? \Vhat would
the productive relation hetween an active identity ami the present, the
filture and the past be;> And what political, social and cultural implica-
tions would an active identity have?
THE ITALIAN rORUM
H!,
Almost ten years ago, in 1996, I organised a conference on Compara-
tive Literature at La Trobe University. I decided that one session of
the conference should discuss translation and the impact of translation
and translation studies on the reception of comparative literature. One
of the guest speakers \\'as the author Hobert Dessaix. His presentation
was, as usual, challenging and intriguing.s However, what stuck in my
mind about Dessaix's paper above everything else was the architectural
metaphor he ollered to articulate his view of translation. He said that
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translation is lil,e building a German castle in the Dandenongs (a hilly
suburb in Melbourne). Clearly, something will tell you that that castle
is not really a German castle. Yet it is still there, visible, experiencable,
readable. If what you really want is to see and experience a German
castle, Dessaix argued, then there is nothing left but to go to Germany.
No amount of criticism, hair splitting "buts" and "ifs", ad,iustments and
refurbishments will evcr turn the German castle in the Dandenongs
into a real, authentic German castle.
13.
The idea is that there is no ideal, perfect translation. \Vhich also means
that there is no ideal, perfect double. And this is a great relief because
the idea of a perfect translation is contrary to the very essence of
translation, as the idea of a perfectly identical double is anathema to
our true essence as unique and inalienable singularities.
14-.
The existence of an original, whatever that might mean, implies the
existence of a translation and vice-versa. Translation and origin.al are
J'elational and not substantial. One cannot exist without the other. The
original needs the translation to ex ist as the original and the transla-
tion needs the original to be itself This sOllnds so true, and also so
banal and trivial until we begins to investigate not so much the original
and the translation hut the extremely interesting process that the rela-
tion between translation and original brings about. The epistemolog-
ical significance of this relation might perhaps be brought home more
powerfully when considering the need to relate to the "other" to malw
sense of what we are, to see who we are. The other is a mirror without
which our life would simply be intangible and inherently invisible to
ourselves. In the book Poet I)' and the hlte I.!l the Senses, Susan Stewart
writes:
The voice and the eyes take part in the 1110rt' g-eneral truth that I
cannot witness l11y O\\'n motion as a wholt': I cannot sec what is alive
about myst'lf and so depend on the view of otlH:'rs. It is the \'iewpoint
of the helo\'t'd that gives witlH:'SS to what is al i\'t' in onr heing9
like the idea of the translation as the '\'iewpoint of the beloved that
gives witness to what is ali\'e" in the original.
15.
Our very prodnctivity, our very being is predicated upon the existence
of the relation between the original and the translation, and this is
not only true fClr literature. In f;lct, I wish to write about memory. As
Dessaix said on that evening of 19~J(), whene\'er somebody sees an
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architectonic translation the notion of "bad" inevitably arises. V\'hat
they do not realise when they claim that that translation is a "bad"
translation, is that a translation must perforce be "bad". What they
utter is a signilicant truth, however lor reasons completely opposite to
those they proclaim.
16.
The Italian Forum on Norton Street, Sydney, was opened in 200 I. The
Italian Forulll is a residential as well as business complex in the heart
of the so-called Little Italy of Sydney. The cultural scope behind this
developlllent was to re-create the idea, the leeling and the function of
an Italian square. The Forum is divided into three layers. The ground
floor and the first level are occupied by restaurants, cales and shops
while the other levels are taken by residential units and tlats. Private
balconies and windows open on the public space beneath, enabling
exchange and constant llialogue between the public and the private.
17.
The Italian ForulII is meant to bring alive the idea of an authentic
Italian square in the middle of Sydney. But what is an authentic Italian
square? It is perhaps the most emblematic embodiment of the con-
nection between the public and the private. Let us take, for instance,
of Campo de' Fiori in Home, where cafes, restaurants, shops of lIIany
descriptions share the space with a lively fruit and vegetable market and
a host of apartments which O\'erlook the bustling activity taking place
at ground level. It must have a ti)lllltain and a statile. The statue, in the
instance of Campo de' Fiori, is the statue of Giordano Bruno who was
burnt at the stake in this very square. Campo de' Fiori, like many other
squares in Italy, is a place to go and relax while sipping cotlee or wine,
to have something to eat in-between shifts, do the shopping, chat. It is
simultaneously an oasis and a bustling centre of activity, a place where
one enters and exists at ease, a convergence of streets and desires, a
pulsating heart that attracts, that pulls in. All the narrow and some-
times cil'cuitous streets that surround the square seem to have been
designed with the express purpose of leading the passer-by to it; like a
well-constructed spider web, you do not know how you ended up right
in the middle of it.
18.
The Italian sqU<lre, whatever else it might be, is essentially a place of
exile I.'om the linearity and purposetidness of d<ly-to-day life. Its cir-
cularity, its con-fusion between private and public, its sense of history
that glances at you f.'om its tall statues, the sound of water, all this
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flllTes the walker to stop, 1001" rest, even f()r a moment, to think, to look
up and to give in to a sense of eternal space and time,
19.
It is no accident that the square is so important to the exilic mind. And
it does not seem a coincidence that the exilic imagination wisheo to
re-create a square as a way to not only negotiate memory but also to
produce a narrative for those who do not haH' JIIeJllories. Rut why is it
that the Italian Forum is so dillerent, almost to the point of the gro-
tesque? The statue of Dante, for instance, is nothing but a caricature
of Dante. It is a little, insignilicallt, almost ridiculous figure, posing
as to deliberately attract smiles and sniggers. \Vhy is there so nllll:h
concrete, so heavy, so temporally anchoring? In other words, why is the
Italian Forum wrong?
20.
The Italian Forum is a translation, and as such it is an interpretation
of what has been seen, been experienced, and yet remains irretrievably
negative, out of reach, absent. There is no Italian square in Sydney,
just as there is no French author by the name of Hobert Dessaix (all
of Dessaix's books have been translated into French). There are only
translations. Rut it is precisely the impossibility of lilsing and con-
Iilsing the original with the translation that gives rise to the tremen-
dous significance of the productive relation between the original and
the translation; a productive relation that generates a filrther narrative,
usually unwritten, unspoken and non-articulated, and yet so essential to
the understanding of what we do and why we do it like that.
21.
I w'ould like to take the case of the migTant. For the migrant it is the
power of a clearly visible image (the memory of the past) that stamps
itself over the pliable surl~ICl: of the pl'esent. It is the extraordinary
visibility and vividness of that memory, of the original, that suddenly
demands that the gaze "tIIrn ahead" to compare that image with the
manifested reality. Clearly, the "turning ahead" is not to the origin, but
instead to the reality of the exilic condition. The "turning ahead" is a
movemellt bad, into the present where the visionary memories of the
past crumble, dissol\'l' against the backdrop of incomparability. It is
this impossibility of comparing that induces the migrant to huild struc-
tllres, "rear huildings that can actually sustain, absorb the turning gaze.
The urban design of migrant and ethnic suburbs all around the world
are testimonies to the urgency and necessity of erecting these screens,
these theatrical props which exist as tangihle phantoms and simulacra,
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whose ultimate purpose is to simply reflect. These buildings are not
reminuers of a lost past, rather, essential supports ftlr a present whose
existence uepenus entirely on their being there. On the other hand they
cannot be the sallie. In fact, sameness will annul and destroy the memo-
ries, and ultimately deny the present. They have to be different and yet
similar; they might be called "bad translations". And yet their essence,
their very purpose is predicated upon them being "bad". ~1emory, like
translation, can only exist in the latency of its origin. It is in this sense
that these buildings reflect, not as a mirror but more like a window
where the shape of those who look through it are faintly sketcheu. The
perfection of the memories of the origin is vaguely imprinted on these
buildings, and yet so remowd that the gaze that "turns ahead" must
perfc)rce be f()rwanllooking. This "turning ahead" is not only the site of
suspension but also the site of the making of memories. It is here, on
the stage of memories that memory is made, and it is in the uncertainty
of the comparison-which is also the necessary relation of produc-
tion-that memory gro\\'s, constantly, incessantly. The perfect memory
of the origin that we carry belt)re us is nothing more than the result of
this "turning ahead" to face the indefinite. the "had" and the unfinished.
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